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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










SWISS RE INTERNATIONAL S.E., f/k/a SR International Business Insurance Company 
PLC; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; ZURICH AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY; CHARTIS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY; ACE 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; STARR  TECHNICAL RISKS AGENCY 
INC; GENERAL SECURITY INDEMNITY COMPANY OF ARIZONA; ARCH 
INSURANCE COMPANY; LANCASHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED; 
CATLIN LLOYDS  SYNDICATE NO. 2003 SJC; O'FARRELL LLOYDS 
SYNDICATE NO. 1036 COF; NAVIGATORS MANAGEMENT COMPANY INC; 
STELLAR INSURANCE LTD; NOBLE ASSURANCE COMPANY; CUNNINGHAM 
LINDSEY US INC; QBE MARINE & ENERGY SYNDICATE 1036 
 
Swiss Re: International S.E. f/k/a SR International Business Insurance Company PLC, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Zurich American Insurance Company, Chartis 
Property Casualty Company, Ace American Insurance Company, Starr Technical Risks 
Agency Inc., General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona, Arch Insurance 
Company, Lancashire Insurance Company Limited, Catlin Lloyds Syndicate No. 2003 
SJC, Navigators Management Company Inc., QBE Marine & Energy Syndicate 1036, 
                                                                         Appellants in 13-3434 and 13-3436 
 
Cunningham Lindsey US Inc., 
                                                    Appellant in 13-3435 
____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware (No. 12-cv-1097 & No. 12-cv-1460) 
District Judge: Hon. Leonard P. Stark 
____________ 
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2014 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
(Filed: August 22, 2014) 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Motiva Enterprises LLC twice sued its insurers in Delaware state court. In the first 
action, Motiva sought a declaration that its insurance policy covered a property damage 
claim; in the second, Motiva sought an injunction against arbitration proceedings. 
Motiva’s insurers, the defendants in both cases, removed to federal court. Motiva moved 
the District Court to remand the cases, relying on forum-selection language contained in 
the parties’ insurance policy. The District Court accepted Motiva’s argument and granted 
the motion. Because the insurance policy selects Delaware’s state courts as the exclusive 
forum for these disputes, we affirm.  
I. Background 
After Motiva’s property caught fire, it sued its insurers in Delaware Superior Court. 
Motiva sought a declaration that its insurance policy covered the damage. One of the 
insurers, Swiss Re, removed the action to federal district court. It asserted diversity and 
federal question jurisdiction. The insurers then commenced arbitration proceedings 
against Motiva, citing arbitration clauses of the policy. Motiva responded by filing an 
action in Delaware’s Court of Chancery to enjoin the arbitration. The defendants 
removed that case to federal court, too. 
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Motiva moved the District Court for remand. It argued that the parties expressly 
agreed to litigate coverage disputes in Delaware state court and that the insurers waived 
their right to remove. Motiva pointed to language in the Schedule to the insurance policy 
that specified, “[i]n the event of a dispute between the Insured and Insurers,” the terms of 
the policy would be subject to “the Law of Delaware” and “Jurisdiction of the State of 
Delaware, USA.” App’x 61. Motiva also noted that parties “agree[d] to submit, except 
where the dispute relates to the amount to be paid under this Policy only, to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts stated in the Schedule and to comply with all requirements to 
give such jurisdiction.” App’x 80.  
In response, the insurers emphasized that the policy elsewhere stated that “[n]othing 
in this Clause constitutes or should be understood to constitute a waiver of Underwriters’ 
rights . . . to remove an action to a United States District Court.” Id. They also contended 
that the term “Jurisdiction of the State of Delaware,” used in the policy Schedule, 
included federal courts situated in Delaware. 
After analyzing the parties’ arguments and the language of the contract, the District 
Court granted Motiva’s motions. The insurers appealed. 
II. Jurisdiction 
We have limited jurisdiction over remand orders. “If at any time before final 
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction” over a case 
removed from state court, “the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Generally, 
“[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not 
reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). When the remand order is 
not based on a defect in the removal procedure or a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
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however, § 1447(d) does not prohibit appellate review. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
517 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1996).  
The District Court’s remand order rested on the parties’ forum-selection clause, so 
§ 1447(d) does not apply. See Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.3d 1207, 1216 (3d 
Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we construe the remand order to effectively terminate the 
federal litigation and exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
III. Discussion1 
Parties may contractually waive their right to remove an action to federal court. See 
New Jersey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 640 F.3d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 2011). The parties dispute 
whether, to be effective, the waiver must appear in the policy’s plain and ordinary 
language, or whether the waiver must appear in clear and unambiguous language because 
the policy’s arbitration clauses implicate the Federal Arbitration Act’s more exacting 
removal-waiver rule. Compare Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds 
for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying “clear and 
unambiguous” standard) with Merrill Lynch & Co., 640 F.3d at 548 (applying “plain and 
ordinary meaning” standard). We conclude that the policy unambiguously waives 
removal and, therefore, affirm without deciding which standard to apply. 
We agree with the District Court’s keen analysis of the contract. Although the policy 
language appears contradictory at first glance—selecting Delaware’s courts as the forum 
in one clause, yet preserving removal in another—upon closer inspection it is coherent 
                                              
1 We exercise plenary review of these contractual and waiver issues. See Ario v. 
Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 
277, 287 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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and complementary. As the District Court concluded, the policy contemplates three types 
of disputes: 
The three types of claims are: (1) disputes over an amount to be 
paid; (2) disputes over a failure to pay; and (3) any other disputes 
concerning the Policy, including coverage. The first category of 
disputes is the subject of the “Arbitration” section of the Policy, 
which channels such disputes first to mediation and, if unresolved, 
“shall then be referred to arbitration . . . [in] London, England. The 
second category is the subject of Section 13’s “Disputes Clause” and 
specifically its subsection on “Service of Suit.” This provision 
provides that “in the event of the failure of the Underwriters hereon 
to pay,” the dispute may be brought to “a court of competent 
jurisdiction within the State of Delaware;” with respect to this 
category of disputes, the parties reserve their right to remove. Hence, 
the Policy’s express right to remove is limited to disputes over a 
failure to pay. The third category deals with all other disputes 
concerning the Policy, including—as here—disputes over coverage. 
The handling of this third category of disputes is addressed in 
Section 13’s “Disputes Clause;” this category of disputes is subject 
to “the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts stated in the Schedule,” 
i.e., the Delaware state courts. 
App’x 20 (citations omitted). Because this dispute concerns coverage, it must be 
presented to the Delaware state courts. 
We reject the insurers’ argument that the words “[n]othing in this Clause constitutes 
or should be understood to constitute a waiver of Underwriters’ rights . . . to remove” 
modify the forum-selection clause. App’x 80. As the District Court noted, “this Clause” 
refers to the Service of Suit section, not to the policy as a whole. App’x 19. Any other 
reading would ignore or contradict the arbitration and forum-selection clauses elsewhere 
in the policy. We also reject the insurers’ argument that the term “Jurisdiction of the State 
of Delaware, USA,” see App’x 61, can be construed to encompass the jurisdiction of 
federal courts located in Delaware. A stipulation to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts 
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of a particular state does not simultaneously submit the parties to the distinct jurisdiction 
of the federal courts. 
IV. Conclusion 
We affirm the District Court’s remand order. This dispute concerns coverage. The 
parties selected the courts of the State of Delaware as the exclusive forum for their policy 
coverage disputes. Accordingly, the insurers waived their right to remove the Delaware 
actions to federal court.  
